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ABSTRACT 
One way in which economists might determine how best to balance the competing 
objectives of efficiency and equality is to specify a social welfare function (SWF).  
This paper looks at how the stated preferences of a sample of the general public can 
be used to estimate the shape of the SWF in the domain of health benefits.  The 
results suggest that people are willing to make trade-offs between efficiency and 
equality and that these trade-offs are sensitive to what inequalities exist and to the 
groups across which those inequalities exist.  (90 words) 
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Determining the parameters in social welfare functions using 
expressed preference data: an application to health 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An important consideration when establishing priorities in the public sector is the 
amount of benefit generated by alternative allocations.  As a result, there has been 
considerable research effort devoted to developing technologies that allow the 
benefits from a range of public services to be measured and subsequently valued.  If 
benefits were the only consideration, then the objectives of public policy could be 
defined in terms of the maximisation of these benefits.  However, policy-makers, as 
well as the general public, are also likely to be concerned with how benefits are 
distributed.   
 
Although standard economic models assume that people do not care about 
inequalities, there is increasing interest in the economics literature in peoples 
preferences regarding fairness (Rabin 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).  These models 
focus on self-centred inequality aversion in the sense that people care only about 
their own outcomes relative to those of other people, but they do not care about 
inequality amongst other people per se.  This has important implications for how 
social welfare functions (SWFs) are constructed and how preferences are aggregated 
(for example, see Quesada, 2003).  In this paper, we are concerned with an 
individuals distributional preferences as they relate to the treatment of other people.  
Specifically, our inquiry is into whether a SWF can be constructed from peoples 
other-regarding, or social, preferences (Menzel, 1999). 
 
The SWF is, in principle, a powerful device for determining how best to balance 
these competing objectives of efficiency and equality.  However, in practice, there 
has hitherto been only limited success in developing a SWF that is operationally 
useful.  There have been some attempts to estimate the parameters of SWFs from 
the stated preferences of individuals.  For example, Amiel and Cowell (1999) have 
asked respondents to choose between different distributions of income across 
population groups.   
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Similar attempts have been made to estimate the SWF for health, using relatively 
small samples of students (Dolan and Robinson, 2001).  In this context, a policy 
that maximises population health might be of relatively less benefit to less healthy 
groups, or a policy that reduces inequalities might forego the opportunity to 
improve the health of the relatively healthy.  This paper demonstrates how the 
stated preferences of a sample of the general public can be used to estimate the 
parameters of a SWF in the domain of health.  The issues addressed in this paper 
are of real policy concern in many countries, such as the United Kingdom, Australia 
and New Zealand, that have put into place policies that seek to improve overall 
population health and reduce health inequalities (Department of Health, 1999; Rice 
and Smith, 2001).   
 
In order for the SWF approach to be operationally useful, two main questions need 
to be answered: 1) what type of SWF is to be employed; and 2) how is the shape of 
the SWF to be determined?  Sections 2 and 3 deal with each of these questions in 
turn and Section 4 presents the design of an empirical study that elicited the publics 
preferences over two health programmes, one that maximises health and one that 
reduces inequalities in health between particular population subgroups.  Section 5 
shows how these data can be used to derive a set of relative weights to be given to a 
unit health gain to people from different population subgroups and hence to 
estimate the shape of the SWF.  Section 6 discusses the implications of the results. 
 
II. DEFINING THE SWF 
The SWF in economics textbooks are welfarist in the sense that they rely on an 
individuals subjective assessment of her own well-being and, as such, they are 
concerned with the distribution of individual utility.  In the few empirical studies that 
have sought to empirically estimate the parameters in a SWF, economists have used 
more readily quantifiable proxies for utility, such as in income (Amiel and Cowell, 
1999).  Health economics have a tradition of expressing utility in health-related terms 
e.g. in terms of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), where the quality adjustment 
weight  the Q in the QALY  is typically defined in terms of dimensions of a health 
state classification system (see for example Drummond et al, 2005).  Whilst health (and 
income for that matter) represents only a sub-set of the determinants of utility, it more 
readily allows for interpersonal comparisons and may suffer from fewer of the ethical 
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problems with comparisons of utility identified by Sen (1992).  From a public policy 
perspective, citizens and policy-makers may well prefer to focus on the distribution of 
health across society rather than on the distribution of utility (see for example, Dolan 
and Olsen, 2002; Tsuchiya and Miyamoto, 2009).  
 
In short, there are good normative and practical reasons for defining a health-related 
SWF in terms of the different levels of health experienced by different groups 
(Dolan 1998).  In this paper, differences in health are represented as differences in 
average life.  When the analytical objective is that of searching for a more equal 
distribution of health (rather than utility or health-related utility), a SWF in terms of 
health is potentially more useful in a policy context since life is more readily 
interpersonally comparable than utilities (see Olsen 1997). 
 
In this study, we assume that healthrelated social welfare is a function of: a) the 
average levels of health of different groups within a given population; and b) the 
inequalities in health that exist between those groups.  Of course, differences in 
health exist within any population sub-group, as well as between groups.  In principle, 
the SWF could be estimated across groups of any size, including across individuals, 
but in practice it would be impossible to get reliable health data at such a micro 
level. 
 
There are a number of functional forms that this SWF can take.  In order to deal 
with varying degrees of inequality, an additive SWF with convexity to the origin to 
allow for inequality aversion has been widely used in the literature (Atkinson, 1970; 
Little and Mirrlees, 1974; Layard and Walters, 1994).  Let us start with a SWF with a 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES): 
> @ > @ ,11 rrbra HHW   ED       ,0, !ba HH   ,1  ED   ,1tr   ,0zr   [1]  
where W is the health-related social welfare and Ha and Hb are the average levels of 
health of groups of equal size.  (The function is, of course, generalisable to more 
than two groups, and to groups of different sizes.)  The nature of the SWF, and the 
resulting iso-welfare curves, is determined by r and ơ.   
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The parameter r measures the degree of aversion to inequality, as represented by the 
convexity of the iso-welfare curves.  If r = -1, social welfare is equal to the sum of 
individual health and there is no aversion to inequality.  This utilitarian-type SWF 
results in iso-welfare contours that are straight lines with a gradient of -1.  If r > -1, 
there is aversion to inequality, or diminishing marginal rate of social substitution 
(MRSS) between the health of the two groups: along a given iso-welfare curve, the 
greater the inequalities in health between the two groups, the greater is the weight 
given to the worse-off group relative to the better-off group.  In the extreme, r 
approaches f and all that matters is the health of the worse-off group.  This results 
in a Rawlsian-type SWF with right-angled iso-welfare curves. 
  
The parameters ơ and Ƣdetermine the rate at which the welfare of subgroups a and 
b enter the social welfare calculus.  It might be argued, for example, that relatively 
less weight should be given to those who considered more responsible for their 
poor health (Le Grand, 1991; Schokkaeart and Devooght, 2003).  In the literature 
on SWFs, however, it is common to assume anonymity, which implies that both 
individuals and groups are equally deserving of any given gain in well-being 
(Musgrave, 1959; Harsanyi, 1982; Boadway and Bruce, 1984).  In this paper, we will 
also make this anonymity assumption i.e. that ơ = Ƣ= 0.5. 
  
The objective of this study is to derive the implied weights to be given to a unit 
health gain to one group relative to another.  This is represented as the MRSS along 
the relevant iso-welfare curve.  As such, reference is made only to contours of the 
SWF, and not to the level of social welfare implied by these contours.  In this 
respect, the CES SWF is equivalent to the Atkinson SWF (Atkinson, 1970) that was 
first proposed to address income distributions and has been applied to the health 
context (Wagstaff, 1994).  The CES specification is chosen as the baseline 
specification because it is individualistic, additive, non-decreasing (or monotonic), 
strictly concave, exhibits constant relative inequality aversion (or scale independence 
or homotheticity) and, with ơ = Ƣ, it also satisfies anonymity, and thus, satisfies all 
the conventional requirements of a SWF. 
 
We will also look at two alternative SWF specifications by way of sensitivity analysis.  
These are derived from the generic form: 
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which provides a family of SWFs that are increasing in total health and decreasing in 
inequality in health (Abásolo and Tsuchiya, 2004).  
 
When ƪ = ƫ= 2, the contours become hyperbolic and when ƪ = 1 and ƫ = 2, they 
become parabolic.  The parabolic and hyperbolic specifications are individualistic, 
additive, inequality averse and symmetric.  The parabolic specification satisfies 
constant relative inequality aversion, while the hyperbolic specification satisfies 
constant absolute inequality aversion instead.  The main characteristic of these two 
specifications is that beyond a given level of inequality, social welfare ceases to be 
non-decreasing in composite health.       
 
III. ESTIMATING THE MRSS GIVEN A SWF SPECIFICATION 
The question now is how do we identify the MRS, given a SWF specification?  One 
way is to elicit the preferences of the general public over stylised questions 
specifically designed to allow us to identify points on the same social welfare 
contour.  Williams (1997) suggests that respondents could be presented with the 
current unequal distribution of health and then asked to think about an equal 
distribution of health that makes them indifferent between the two distributions, 
which corresponds to the concept of equally distributed equivalent income by 
Atkinson (1970).  In this way, the general format of the questions would be similar 
to those used in empirical studies that have attempted to measure the degree of 
inequality aversion in relation to income distributions (Amiel and Cowell, 1999; 
Amiel et al, 1999).  However, whilst it is possible to take income from one person 
and transfer it to another, it is not possible to redistribute health in the same way.  
Therefore, it seems more appropriate to design the empirical study in terms of the 
distribution of gains in health from an initial position. 
 
Figure 1 shows the basis of the questions.  The initial situation (I) is presented to 
respondents together with a programme (A) that will benefit both groups by the 
same amount.  They are then presented with an alternative programme (B) that 
targets the benefit on the worse-off group.  The aim then is to determine, in an 
iterative way, how much Programme B would have to benefit the worse-off group 
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in order to be considered equally as valuable as Programme A.  Once indifference 
between Programmes A and B has been established, the MRSS of the SWF can be 
calculated.   
 
For the baseline CES specification, the value of r can be obtained by using standard 
spreadsheet procedures (e.g. the goal seek tool in MS Excel), by looking for the 
value of r that makes W[1] identical at two points, X and Y.  Alternatively, for a 
mathematical solution, see Abásolo and Tsuchiya (2004).  The weight implied to the 
less advantaged group a relative to group b is calculated from the MRSS: 
)1( r
a
b
a
b
H
H
dH
dH

»¼
º«¬
ª 
.
 
Provided r > -1, MRSS increases exponentially with the extent of the equality -
efficiency trade-off (since the iso-welfare contour in Figure 1 is convex), and so the 
mean of any group of values would give greater relative weight to the preferences of 
those most concerned about equality.  This makes it difficult to account for the 
strength of each individuals preferences in the overall preferences of a group.  For 
this reason, we will concentrate our analysis and interpretation on the median.  Use 
of the median is also consistent with the median voter rule, which has been used to 
model public policy choices (Mueller 1979). Furthermore, the relationship between 
the number of years traded off and the level of inequality aversion implies that the 
mean of the former will not correspond to the mean of the latter, thus making the 
median a more attractive summary measure to use.  
 
For the hyperbolic and the parabolic specifications, suppose Ha(X), Hb(X) and 
Ha(Y), Hb(Y) represent two points on the same indifference curve.  By solving 
W[2](X)=W[2](Y) for C:  
> @ > @
> @ > @EE
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)()()()(
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the relative weight for the less advantaged group at point (Ha,Hb) will be given by: 
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Any one respondent could be asked to adopt a number of different perspectives when 
answering questions of the kind used in this study (see Dolan et al, 2003). In this 
study, we asked respondents to adopt a citizen-type perspective, where they are not 
explicitly asked to think about being in either group.  This is the perspective 
adopted by Amiel and Cowell (1999) in their empirical studies on income 
inequalities.  To us, and as famously emphasised by Rousseau (1762), there is a 
legitimate distinction between a persons self-regarding preferences based on her own 
self-interest and her society-regarding preferences which reflect her views about what 
society should look like.  The distinction has more recently received attention  and 
support  from a number of economists and political scientists, including Harsanyi 
(1955) and Etzioni (1986).  We therefore collected information on a range of 
background characteristics in order to examine the extent to which self-interest 
might be playing a part in responses. 
 
IV. THE QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 
Differences in health in this study, as noted in Section 2, have been defined in terms 
of average life expectancy.  The most obvious differences in mortality in the UK 
exist between the social classes (Acheson 1998).  Of the six social classes often used 
in British surveys, we employ data concerning the top and the bottom classes, which 
highlights the extent of the prevailing inequalities and has the advantage that the 
fraction of the population in each of these classes is roughly the same (about 7% in 
each case).  On average, people in the highest social class (such as doctors and other 
professionals) live five years longer than those in the lowest social class (unskilled 
manual workers such as cleaners.   
 
Scenarios with population subgroups other than social class are also used.  
Differences of the same magnitude (five years) in average life expectancy exist 
between women and men.  This means that by presenting separate respondents with 
identical questions regarding life expectancy, but relating them to differences by sex 
instead of by social class, it is possible to test whether the degree of inequality 
aversion is a function of the groups across which the inequalities exist.  To further 
test the sensitivity of inequality aversion, other respondents were presented with the 
same life expectancy differences across groups that were simply defined as the 
healthiest 20% and the unhealthiest 20% of the population.   
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The questionnaire was administered during a face-to-face interview, which gave the 
interviewer the opportunity to assess the respondents understanding of the task and 
provided the respondent with the opportunity to ask any clarificatory questions.  
The interview began with a brief description of the task and an explanation of the 
population sub-group used.  The questionnaire was developed through in-depth 
interviews and extensive piloting, during which time it emerged that the clearest way 
in which to represent the health of the two groups was in the form of graphical 
representations, as shown in the Appendix.  Respondents were first asked to make a 
discrete choice between Programme A (that benefits both groups by the same 
amount) and Programme B (that targets the same amount of overall benefit on the 
worse-off group).  They were told that the two groups were of approximately equal 
size and that the two Programmes would cost the same.   
 
For those respondents who chose Programme A, it was assumed that, since they 
were unwilling to target the worse off group when overall benefits were the same, 
they would also be unwilling to target the worse off group when overall benefits 
were reduced, and so no further sub-questions were asked.  Those respondents who 
chose Programme B were presented with a series of pairwise choices in which the 
benefits from choosing B were gradually reduced.  This order was chosen to make 
the trade-off between efficiency and equality as transparent as possible and because 
it was felt that it would be cognitively less demanding for respondents than a 
random order that would have required them to jump around between different 
trade-offs.  Note that respondents were not provided with the opportunity to state 
that they were indifferent between the two Programmes.  This option was in the 
pilot interviews but was never chosen and in fact caused confusion. 
 
The interviews were carried out in two rounds using different respondents.  In the 
first round around half the respondents were given the social class scenario and the 
other half were given the sex scenario.  In the second round around half the 
respondents were given the social class scenario and the other half were given the 
quintiles scenario.   The response categories presented in the two rounds 
(independently of scenario) are shown in Table 1.  Respondents in the first round 
who initially chose Programme B were presented with six additional pairwise 
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choices.  The response categories in the second round of interviews were revised in 
the light of the distribution of responses from the first round, resulting in only four 
additional pairwise choices in the second round.  In addition to some of the 
response categories in the first round being largely redundant, this allowed us to test 
whether respondents were following a particular pattern of responses e.g. choosing 
the middle option. 
 
For those respondents who initially chose to target on Programme B but then 
switched at some point to Programme A, their point of indifference has been taken 
to be half-way between the last point at which they chose B and the first point at 
which they chose A.  The first columns of Table 2 present the implied points of 
indifference, their associated inequality aversion parameters depending on SWF 
specification, and their corresponding implied relative weights to the worst off 
group at the initial point, given the options in Table 1.  The precise trade-offs made 
by those who choose not to target and by those who always choose to target are 
indeterminate, and so, strictly speaking, inequality aversion can only be calculated 
for those respondents who switch from Programme B to Programme A at some 
point.  Having said this, for those who chose A in the initial pairwise comparison, 
we have assumed that they are inequality neutral (although we cannot rule out the 
possibility that some respondents may have favoured increased inequality).  For 
those who always chose B, we have assumed that they are indifferent at the implied 
point presented on the last row, but again we cannot be sure. 
 
As can be seen, the choice functional form for the SWF does not have much effect 
on the relative weight given to the two groups except in the highly inequality averse 
region.  And even in this range, it is more important to identify the preferences 
accurately than it is to identify the correct functional form to represent those 
preferences.  Under extreme inequality aversion, where a reduction in inequality is 
preferred even when it entails loss in the health of the better off so that the 
monotonicity principle is violated, the CES specification can no longer 
accommodate such preferences.  However, the hyperbolic and the parabolic 
specifications can, and the relative weights across these two functional forms are 
similar to each other.  
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V. THE EMPIRICAL STUDY 
In order to interview a broadly representative sample of the general population, 
every 8th person on the electoral register in three wards in York, UK, was contacted 
and invited to participate, for which they would receive £15.  Out of a total of 1,500 
letters of invitation, 467 people (31%) agreed to take part.  To ensure 
representativeness, 140 respondents were selected for interview based on 
information on a broad range of characteristics obtained from their reply slips.  In 
total, 130 individuals were interviewed.  The interviews took place at the University 
of York and lasted for about an hour.  The achieved sample was broadly 
representative of the population of the Yorkshire and Humberside region: 48% 
were male (compared to 47% for the region as a whole); 50% were aged under 45 
(compared to 50%); 67% had children (compared to 66%); 54% were employed 
(compared to 56%); and 60% had the minimum level of education (compared to 
61%).  This paper is based on the life expectancy question, which appeared at the 
beginning of the interview and was answered by all 130 respondents. 
 
The results are summarised in Table 2 where the last five columns present the 
distribution of responses.  The numbers of respondents were 29 and 37 for the 
social class scenario across the two rounds, 31 for the sex scenario (in round one) 
and 33 for the quintiles scenario (in round two).  Since the implied trade-offs that 
respondents made between the social classes did not differ across the rounds (Mann 
Whitney U Test, p>0.05), pooled responses are also reported.  Using these pooled 
results, the median respondent is indifferent between people in the highest and 
lowest social classes living on average to be 80 and 75, respectively (i.e. the outcome 
for choosing Programme A), and these groups living to be 78 and 75.5, respectively 
(i.e. the outcome for Programme B from the median respondent).  Depending on 
the SWF specification, this implies that a marginal health gain to the lowest social 
class is valued 6.8 to 9.9 times more than a marginal health gain to the highest social 
class.  This is also the median response when the sub-groups are defined in terms of 
the healthiest and unhealthiest quintiles of the population.  However, when identical 
data are presented but the sub-groups are defined by sex, the median preference is 
to favour no targeting of men at all, thus implying that a marginal health gain to 
men and to women are equally valued.  The responses were not related to any of the 
personal characteristics (using the F2 test, p>0.05). 
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VI. DISCUSSION 
This study has sought to determine the shape of a health-related SWF from peoples 
stated preferences over various equality -efficiency trade-offs.  While a CES was 
used as the baseline specification, similar results are derived from the hyperbolic and 
the parabolic specifications. 
 
Overall, the results seem plausible, suggesting that there is aversion to inequalities in 
life expectancy, but its extent is sensitive to the groups across which the inequalities 
exist.  However, the study also raises a number of methodological issues that 
warrant further discussion.  In the first part of each question, the information 
regarding the size of the health gains of the two Programmes was easy to 
understand and, in the second part of each question, the implications of choices 
were made clear through changes in the size of the bars on the graph.  Nevertheless, 
to facilitate this visual representation, the scales on the graphs did not start at zero 
(see the Appendix), and this could have led some respondents to perceive that the 
relative difference between the two groups was larger than it really was. 
 
In general, it has been shown that very subtle changes in the framing of a question 
can sometimes have a dramatic effect on responses (for an excellent review, see 
Rabin 1998).  This study was designed to minimise the effects of certain framing 
effects but it is impossible to remove every potential bias.  For example, we were 
aware of the evidence from other studies that suggests that respondents might be 
reluctant to give all the benefit to one individual or group (see, for example, 
Cuadras-Morato et al 2001).  We went further, though, and asked respondents who 
chose not to target if they would have targeted if there had instead been a one-year 
benefit to the better-off group (and hence a three-year benefit to the worse-off 
group).  None of these respondents chose to revise their answers.  
   
It is now well established that respondents may give greater weight to the losses of 
one group as compared to an equivalent gain to the other group (Schweitzer 1995).  
Therefore, the questions were designed so that neither Programme in the two 
questions involved any losses, and so that neither Programme was presented as 
representing the status quo.  However, it is possible that loss aversion may also be 
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present when considering potential as well as actual losses from a particular reference 
point (Dolan and Robinson 2001).  Therefore, if some respondents adopted the 
potential gains available to both groups in Programme A as their reference point, 
then Programme B would involve a loss to the better-off group.  It would be 
interesting, and policy relevant, to test with further research how sensitive the 
degree of inequality aversion is to variation in the initial situation. 
 
There is a status quo bias of a different kind that might have made respondents 
more inclined to stick with Programme B if they chose it initially.  This relates to the 
fact that respondents were always presented with response categories in the same 
order; that is, Programmes A and B start out being equally effective and then B 
becomes incrementally less effective.  This ordering was chosen to make the 
equality -efficiency trade-off as transparent as possible and was informed by the 
results from the pilot interviews which suggested that the trade-off questions would 
have been cognitively too difficult if the ordering of the response categories was 
randomised.  However, there is the possibility of a status quo bias whereby some 
respondents get locked into choosing B throughout (see Samuelsen and 
Zeckhauser 1988).  On the other hand, there is some limited evidence that shows 
there may be a left hand side bias: when respondents are asked to choose between 
two options laid out next to each other, the default choice is the option on the left 
hand side, and the right hand side option will be chosen only when it is significantly 
more preferable than the default option on the left hand side (see, for example, 
McIntosh and Ryan, 2003).   Thus, there are two potential biases working in 
opposite directions. 
 
Despite these concerns about the data, we believe that this study represents an 
advance in terms of both the methodology used and the implications for future 
research that seeks to enhance the policy usefulness of stated preference data.  It 
suggests that people are willing to forego overall health in order to reduce 
differences in average life expectancy between the social classes.  On the other 
hand, differences in the average life expectancies of men and women did not seem 
to matter much at all, with the median respondent unwilling to sacrifice any overall 
gains in life expectancy in order to target men.  Tsuchiya and Williams (2005) tries 
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to get behind some of the reasons for the very different attitudes towards health 
inequalities by sex as compared to those by social class. 
 
In conclusion, this study has demonstrated that, using carefully designed 
questionnaire instruments, the SWF can develop from being a theoretical construct 
to becoming a potentially powerful practical policy tool.  A survey instrument can 
be designed that elicits meaningful trade-off responses from the general population 
that can then be used to determine the shape of the SWF.  We therefore believe that 
the study indicates a promising new avenue of economic enquiry that is relevant to 
important policy questions in health care and other areas of public policy.  
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Ha: health of the less advantaged group 
Hb: health of the more advantaged group 
I: initial point 
It is assumed that ơ = Ƣ  
 
A: outcome offered by Programme A 
the horizontal broken line: the set of options (1 to n) offered by the alternative 
Programme B 
B: the point at which the median respondent is indifferent between the two 
Programmes, and thus the point through which the iso-welfare curve crosses the 
broken line 
 
 Figure 1: The SWF and the life expectancy questions 
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Table 1: The response options   
 
The initial situation is one in which group a (the worst-off group) live to be 73 and 
group b (the best-off group) live to be 78.  The numbers in the Table show average 
increases in life expectancy per group depending on the Programmes chosen for 
each of the pairwise choices. 
 
1st round of interviews 2nd round of interviews 
Programme A  Programme B Programme A Programme B 
Group a Group b Group a Group b Group a Group b Group a  Group b 
+2 +2 +4 +0 +2 +2 +4 +0 
+2 +2 +3.5 +0 - - - - 
+2 +2 +3 +0 +2 +2 +3 +0 
+2 +2 +2.5 +0 - - - - 
+2 +2 +2 +0 +2 +2 +2 +0 
+2 +2 +1.5 +0 +2 +2 +1.5 +0 
+2 +2 +1 +0 +2 +2 +1 +0 
 
 - indicates where a response category was not offered to respondents 
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Table 2:  The three SWF specifications and the results   
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CES hyperbolic parabolic 
Social class3 Sex 3 (n
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relative w
eigh
t 
at in
itial p
o
in
t
2 
R
o
u
n
d
 1 
(n
=
 29) 
R
o
u
n
d
 2 
(n
=
37) 
P
o
o
led
 
(n
=
66) 
(75,80) ~ (77,78) -1.0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 9 15 24 20 12 
(75,80) ~ (76.75,78) 2.3 1.25 3.30 1.25 0.01 1.24 0 - 0 1 - 
(75,80) ~ (76.5,78) 5.9 1.58 6.80 1.58 0.02 1.56 - 5 5 - 2 
(75,80) ~ (76.25,78) 9.8 2.05 10.57 2.08 0.03 2.04 0 - 0 0 - 
(75,80) ~ (75.75,78) 20.1 4.04 19.36 4.57 0.06 4.36 2 - 2 1 - 
(75,80) ~ (75.50,78) 27.9 6.80 24.68 9.94 0.08 9.00 - 11 11 - 14 
(75,80) ~ (75.25,78) 41.2 16.38 30.94 -83.12 0.10 -559.00 11 - 11 5 - 
(75,80) ~ (74.75,78) unspecified unspecified 47.96 -4.40 0.16 -4.58 4 5 9 3 3 
(75,80) ~ (74.25,78) unspecified unspecified 77.25 -2.28 0.25 -2.32 0 0 0 - 1 
(75,80) ~ (73.5,78) unspecified unspecified 225.84 -1.31 0.74 -1.31 3 1 4 1 1 
Notes 
1. Inequality aversion parameter is r for the CES, C for the hyperbolic and the parabolic 
2. Relative weight at initial point is the implied equality weight given to group b relative to group a at the initial point where life expectancy for groups 
a and b are 73 and 78 respectively. 
3. Median respondent in bold; - indicates where a response category was not offered to respondents 
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Appendix: Example of the questions across social class 
 
As you might know, average life expectancy differs by social class. 
 
Whilst actual life expectancy varies between individuals, on average, people in social class 
1 live to be 78 and in social class 5 they live to be 73.  
 
Imagine that you are asked to choose between two programmes which will increase 
average life expectancy.  Both programmes cost the same.  
 
In the two graphs below the light grey part shows average life expectancy, and the dark 
grey part shows the increase in life expectancy.  There is a separate graph for each of the 
programmes.   
 
As you can see, Programme A is aimed at both social classes equally and Programme B is 
aimed more at social class 5. 
 
Please indicate whether you would choose A or B by ticking one box.  
 
 
Programme A      Programme B 
 
       Class I            Class V              Class I               Class V  
  
 
 
 
If the respondent chose A, that was the end of the question.  If the respondent chose B, 
she was told: 
 
Choosing Programme B might mean that the increase in life expectancy is less overall.  
For each of the six [or four, depending on the round] choices below, please tick one box 
to indicate whether you would still choose B, or whether you would now choose A.  
 
The presentation of the choices was of the same kind as that illustrated above 
 68     68 
 
 70 
2 years 
 74 
 72 
 76 
 78 
 80 
 82 
2 years 
 
70 
0 years 
74 
 72 
 76 
 78 
 80 
 82 
4 years 
